Historical injustice and its perpetuation

This is an edited version of an essay I wrote for my PHIL class. It was great because it didn't need references, so could be much more ranty than my usual academic writing. To be clear, I think there is just as much an argument on the basis of the need to uphold Te Tiriti as there is on the basis that I have argued; but I had to refer to various readings, none of which were about NZ specifically, which is why the more general argument has been followed.

Do governments in countries such as New Zealand owe compensation or restitution to descendants of victims of injustice?  Why or why not?

The NZ crown does owe reparation to Māori iwi and hapu who have been systematically wronged in various ways since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. This is not because Māori today are the descendants of victims of injustice. This is because they, as a collective, are themselves victims of injustice: historical injustice, and present injustice. These do not exist independently of one another; they are inherently intwined in a complex web of colonialism and oppression which perpetuates to this day.

Injustice done to individuals is distinct to injustice to collectives. Historical injustice can be separated into three categories, in order to acknowledge this distinction. The first is victims of injustice themselves, even if years later, when the victims are still living. They can be directly compensated, which is unproblematic. The second is groups that collectively are victims. Maori and other indigenous groups clearly fit this category. The third is descendants of victims, as individuals. This category is more problematic, and raises plenty of complex questions. Fortunately, this does not need to be addressed in this context, as we are clearly dealing with a collective.

Pakeha as a nation are responsible to Māori as a nation for past wrongs and their continued perpetuation. Miller has a theory of why nations can be collectively responsible. The first step is to examine what constitutes a nation. There are five criteria, although these only need to be generally held, and not by all members. They are: people feel they belong together because of what they have in common; collective understandings about public culture; recognition of obligations to each other; continued existence of nation as a valuable good, and aspiration to be politically self-determining. The shared nationality is partially constitutive of the identity of each member of the nation.

Do Māori have a collective identity? Of course, until Pakeha came to New Zealand, Māori were comprised of distinct iwi and hapu, and there was no conception of “māoridom” as a whole. This only began to emerge in the late 19^th century, for example when the Kingitanga movement was established in the 1890s as a response to British collective identity. Since then, Māori collective identity has only strengthened, and while individual Māori obviously disagree on important issues, this is unproblematic by Miller’s definition. The above factors are, in general, met, and there is a conception of a Māori nation.

More complicated perhaps is the question of whether there is such thing as a Pakeha nation. If there is one, who does it include? All New Zealanders who are not Māori? Only those of European descent? What is it that makes one Pakeha? I think the term Pakeha must only apply to those of European descent, for two reasons. Firstly, that is the generally accepted use of the word, for better or worse. Secondly, “Pakeha” signifies racial privilege. It is unfortunate that this privilege exists, of course, but since it does, it is our duty to recognise it. If other marginalised races were to be included in this definition, we would risk ignoring white privilege.

This exclusive definition is of course problematic. It means that many New Zealanders are neither Māori nor Pakeha. There is no good reason why a white person who has recently immigrated should be able to represent the Pakeha nation; while a person of colour whose family has been here for generations should not be able to represent the Pakeha nation. The solution, at least for the purposes of this essay, could be to recall that nationality is only partially constitutive of identity – above all, we are all New Zealanders. And the Crown represents all New Zealanders, not just Pakeha. So while it is predominantly Pakeha who owe compensation, this needs to be done, in practice, by the Crown, which represents the people of NZ as a whole.

Assuming there is such thing as a Pakeha nation (notwithstanding my reservations above), what is it that makes us collectively responsible? In a New Zealand context, we are responsible because we are Tangata Tiriti – people of the Treaty. The Treaty of Waitangi is the only thing that gives the crown’s sovereignty any moral legitimacy, and Pakeha any right to be here. We must, therefore, uphold our end of the bargain; if we ignore the Treaty, we are illegitimate occupiers of a land which is not our own. But there is also another argument that can be more widely applied, using Miller’s “cooperative practice” model. This is the theory that we are responsible as a nation, because we have benefitted, and continue to benefit, from wrongs done to Māori in the past and the present.

It is fairly uncontentious that the system of individual ownership imposed on Māori was mostly for the purposes of facilitating the dispossession of Māori from their land, and the cheap sale of it to settlers. Countless legal and illegal methods were used for this, and their detail does not need to be explored. It is now generally agreed that this was morally wrong, and great harm was suffered. This was, of course, not merely economic – a whole new cultural and legal system was imposed, undermining te tino rangatiratanga, mana, and kaitiakitanga. The Pakeha nation benefitted – this is what allowed settlers to come here, buy cheap land, and start a new life. 

To extend Miller’s argument to cover historic injustice, although he shies away from it himself, is not difficult. I think it can be done simply by giving the cooperative practice model a temporal dimension. We continue to benefit from past wrongs. We have exploited the illegally and/or immorally acquired land for its natural resources which provide the foundation of our economy. We have built towns and cities, a national culture, an identity, a livelihood, which we, as Pakeha, all benefit from. We benefit also from being racially dominant, the norm, the bearers of racial privilege, which serves our interests so much we can easily become unaware of it.

Waldron writes that history is not part of individual identity, but communal identity, and that if we forget about history, we can be lead to believe that our good or bad fortune is a virtue of our race. He acknowledges that injustice tends to not be a discrete event but a systemic pattern, which continues to exist until it is remedied. He writes that it is difficult to know who to give land back to, especially when the wrong happened a long time in the past; but, he also says, this is remedied significantly when the wrong is to a group rather than an individual, as is the case in NZ.

There is a widespread belief that claims to entitlement fade with time, and this is certainly a common perception in NZ. But Waldron correctly identifies that this does not necessarily apply when the dispossessed is a community, rather than an individual, because cultural traditions (which are inherently tied to land in Māori culture) are more resilient that property rights. This is why it is important to conceptualise Māori claims to justice as collective rather than individual.

Waldron writes that claims about historical injustice may be superseded by claims based on present injustice. This comes with the massive caveat, however, that this only applies if an honest attempt is being made to arrange things justly. It is also important to recognise that in many cases, as in NZ, victims of historic injustice are also victims of present injustice. Present-day claims will only override historic ones when they are at odds: when the historically wronged group is now better off than those who were the oppressors. This will rarely be the case; and it is certainly not in NZ.

It is essential to understand the link between past and present, between colonisation and neo-colonisation, between overt racism and its much subtler present day counterpart. Few would deny that Māori are far over-represented in all the statistics. Yet many would argue that this has little to do with historical wrongs, and more to do with “bad luck”. This ignores the obvious – that when a nation is deprived of its land, its culture, its mana, its sovereignty, its language, its customs, and its tikanga, for generations on end, even when overtly discriminatory policies are stopped, the effects of this will not magically go away.

The present does not, and cannot, exist in some kind of vacuum, devoid of links to the past. To believe it does it a convenient myth, certainly, but not a helpful one if we are serious about justice. Present injustices must be remedied, certainly, but so must past injustices; and it is crucial to understand the relationship between them. The record so far has been very mixed, with some successes, and some massive setbacks. There is certainly room for improvement. We need to approach the issue with an open mind, a sense of responsibility, and a genuine desire for justice. Only then will we be able to seriously address the past wrongs done to Māori, in order to bring about a present which is just and fair for all.